Genesis and Development of a Scientific Fact

If this book were solely about the explication of "scientific fact," I would rate it but 1 Star rather than 3. But there is much in this book that is highly relevant and applicable to modern day scientific research and methodology. Of particular interest is Fleck's discussions of 'group think' and what he labels Denkkollektiv (thought collective) and Denkstil (thought style). Indeed, the book is so thought provoking in these and other regards that I have been tempted to rate it with 4 Stars. But after decades of informal study in Natural History, my bias is deeply rooted in discovering the roots of what I have long viewed as an inappropriate understanding of "scientific fact" and why it is thus that Evolutionists have, in my view, come to a wrong conclusion in regards to supposed common ancestry and the application of "fact" to what was once, and properly so, Darwin's hypothesis. Inferences from facts are not themselves facts.As a microbiologist, clearly Fleck had made some great achievement in regards to understanding of syphilis and the importance of the Wassermann Reaction as a diagnostic tool. But as a philosopher, it seems to me that Fleck has greatly over thought matters in terms of attempting to associate "fact" with the historical and sociological understandings of disease, syphilis or other. Clearly, Fleck and others who have accepted a view that scientific "fact" is essentially equivalent to the vernacular "that which we believe to be true" or some other very broad notion of "fact" --- clearly these philosophers have rendered "fact" relatively useless to science. Clearly, in my view, Carnap and the Logical Positivist are closer to being relevant in regards to what goes on in contemporary laboratories and elsewhere in scientific research and thus what is relevant to society and to the discovery of truth.Fleck indicates his error, in my view, early in the book with an inappropriate conceptualization of "scientific fact." He begins his Prologue (p.xxvii) with:"What is fact?"A fact is supposed to be distinguished from transient theories as something definite, permanent, and independent of any subjective interpretation by the scientist. It is that which the various scientific disciplines aim at. The critique of the methods used to establish it constitutes the subject matter of epistemology."If a fact is supposed to be distinguished from theories as Fleck would have it, then how would Fleck or his successors then distinguish between valid observations (indirect observations via a microscope) of microbes from some true or false theories arising from those observations? Fleck ends his Prologue with an example of this clearly inappropriate conceptualization:"A medical fact, the importance and applicability of which cannot be denied, is particularly suitable [as conforming to the principles of unbiased investigation], because it also appears to be very rewarding historically and phenomenologically. I have therefore selected one of the best established medical facts: the fact that the so-called Wassermann reaction is related to syphilis."HOW, THEN, DID THIS EMPIRICAL FACT ORIGINATE AND IN WHAT DOES IT CONSIST?" (Emphaisis is that of Fleck.)Clearly, Fleck has embraced far too broad a conceptualization with his understanding of "empirical fact" in essentially equating "fact" to that which he and others consider to be "true." Not everything that is true is a scientific fact. Surely, while the historical and sociological context of empirical science can be relevant to further discovery and to choice of observations and experiments to make, such broad contexts (which even Fleck sees more as context to "fact" than as defining of "fact") are not relevant to the truth-value of those immediate observations that become the scientific / empirical facts which, after verification as facts, are then eternal. But even excluding the historical and sociological contexts of "fact," clearly Fleck's definition is still too broad and lacking in specificity. Facts are better seen as the specific details, particular events, of the Wassermann Reaction and the specific details of syphilis and certainly not any particular, true or false, relationship between the two. Such facts are then related by law and by theory. But Fleck rather further demonstrates this overly broad view when he writes (p.102):"Facts are never completely independent of each other. They occur either as more or less connected mixtures of separate signals, or as a system of knowledge obeying its own laws. As a result, every fact reacts upon many others. Every change and every discovery has an effect on a terrain that is virtually limitless. It is characteristic of advanced knowledge, matured into a coherent system, that each new fact harmoniously --- though ever so slightly --- changes all earlier facts. Here every discovery is actually a recreation of the whole world as construed by a thought collective."Surely Fleck has it wrong when he writes "each new fact harmoniously [.....] changes all earlier facts." Facts, if indeed they are facts, are not changed by other facts. Of course, we all realize that "Facts are never completely independent of each other." But the better use and understanding of the word "fact" is that of the Logical Positivist, Rudolph Carnap who writes in his book AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE ([1966], 1995, p.5): "[W]e prefer not to call such statements [as all ravens are black, and I add, the Wassermann Reaction, syphilis, or etc.] 'facts'. Facts are particular events." The relationship between unchanging facts is precisely where Carnap more appropriately defines the notion of "law." Contrary to Fleck, facts don't change. Only our understandings of the facts change. The observations that Aristotle made in regards to falling bodies or the observations that Ptolemy made regards planetary movements are as valid today as they were in Aristotle's and Ptolemy's times, respectively (if they were indeed verified at the time as being valid observations). What has changed is our understanding of the facts and their relationship (laws) and the explanations (theories) of those facts and laws. The Wassermann Reaction and syphilis are not themselves facts and certainly any relationship between the two phenomena is not a fact. Newton considered gravity to be a phenomenon. There are now various laws and theories of gravity but the facts are unchanged. Facts are the observations related to falling apples, etc.The great naturalist and scientist, Charles Darwin, knew what a scientific "fact" is. Darwin spent a major portion of his life observing nature and keeping records of his observations. When Darwin wrote the following in his DESCENT OF MAN [1871], his meaning was clear even if his statement was somewhat oxymoronish. (Facts, by definition, cannot be false.) Darwin wrote:"[....] False facts are highly injurious to the progress of science, for they often endure long, but false views, if supported by some evidence, do little harm, for every one takes a salutary pleasure in proving their falseness: and when this is done, one path towards error is closed and the road to truth is often at the same time opened."Those who followed Darwin have, in my opinion, long taken far too much salutary pleasure in not only arguing and endlessly rearguing Darwin's views and refutations thereof, but in allowing Darwin's primary thesis, what they came to label "evolution" with its core idea of common ancestry, to be accepted as a "fact" and thus beyond argument. But evolution, like gravity, is not an observable and not a fact.What is admirable and can be appropriate about Fleck's philosophy, if not carried too far, is his notion of Denkkollektive. Fleck writes (p.39):"If we define 'thought collective' as A COMMUNITY OF PERSONS MUTUALLY EXCHANGING IDEAS OR MAINTAINING INTELLECTUAL INTERACTION, WE WILL FIND BY IMPLICATION THAT IT ALSO PROVIDES THE SPECIAL 'CARRIER' FOR THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF ANY FIELD OF THOUGHT, AS WELL AS FOR THE GIVEN STOCK OF KNOWLEDGE AND LEVEL OF CULTURE. THIS WE HAVE DESIGNATED THOUGHT STYLE. [.....]" (Emphasis is Fleck's.)Such an important concept in science is undoubtedly what helped compel the philosopher of science, Thomas S. Kuhn, noted for his THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS, to choose to write, despite some of his own reservations with Fleck's writing, the Foreword to Fleck's book. But Kuhn's own ideas concerning paradigms as being important to science, to my way of thinking, very well demonstrates the problem of taking Fleck's idea regards thought collectives too far. After all, Aristotle's paradigm and incorrect thinking regards his understandings of falling bodies (i.e., the supposed variance of accelerations) lasted for a couple of millennia. One can only wonder, did cave men not realize, in Aristotle's time or even before, that large boulders seem to fall down a landslide at the same pace as small rocks? Why was Aristotle's false view allowed to prevail for such a long time? Ah, it was Denkkollektive.FURTHER READINGS:In addition to Carnap, also consider the writings of those who are considered by most to have made great contribution to science and mathematics: Hans Reichenbach, Albert Einstein, Kurt Godel, Ernst Mach and others whose names are associated with the Vienna Circle of logical positivists. Consider Anthony M. Graziano and Michael L. Raulin's RESEARCH METHODS: A PROCESS OF INQUIRY (1989). Consider Claude Bernard's AN INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF EXPERIMENTAL MEDICINE ([1852, 1855, 1927], 1957) which was, as of the 1957 Foreword, still studied in France as an important classic.If the student is interested in philosophy (why that would be is beyond me; as long as they get paid for arguing without finding resolutions, they'll continue ad infinitum to do so) rather than science and scientific accomplishments, then perhaps there might be interest in a paper reached by googling "Vienna Circle (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy)." But that article seems to me to exemplify that which the Logical Positivists and the Vienna Circle were opposed to. The article presents seemingly endless argumentation, without real world applicability, by long lists of philosophers and references to arguments of metaphysics versus metaphysics.If ones interest is primarily science or engineering (or even psychology, art, sociology, natural history, architecture, or some other endeavor not particularly designated as a science) then it seems to me that a better approach is to identify some great accomplishments that are of interest. Discover the methodologies and thinking of the persons involved in such accomplishments and how they came to accomplish what they did. They surely didn't spend the majority of their time writing philosophical works (or even scientific papers).

If you are an aspiring medical research scientist and lucky enough to have been directed to, or to have stumbled onto, this book, consider yourself blessed. It is indeed what other reviewers have described as "transformative." And, more. It is, really, a piece of art, derived from the mind of - what I assume to have been - a truly extraordinary man. Just to sit at his feet and listen for awhile will be a joy, despite the work you will need to put into it. And, work it will be. As the book was originally written in a rather convoluted style, and then translated from the German, I suspect you will find it one of the most difficult reads of your career. Nevertheless, I implore you to push on. Your reward will be to become an initiate within a group of philosopher scientists who can say that they have finally begun to understand the true nature of scientific discovery.

This book is a classic, which didn't make it into the English language for several decades of its existence. It was first brought to the attention of the anglophone science studies (which I'm using here as shorthand for history, philosophy & sociology of science and STS naturally) community by another classic, Thomas Kuhn's "Structure of Scientific Revolutions." It has much to offer even for those who know it well. One of these days, I need to get my German up to speed enough to read the OV (original version).

This book is reportedly a classic. It is a translation from German with a forward by Thomas Kuhn, who admits to profiting from reading it before writing his THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS. It is difficult, but contains the overall idea that a community of scholars, with similar expertise produce knowledge as we know it, as opposed to singular individuals. For the science philosopher.

If you're baffled by post-fact politics and bummed about life in the Trumpocalypse, then this is the summer reading for you! Head to the beach, sit back with cool drink, and enjoy the simple pleasures of German philosophy as penned by a persecuted Jew serving under the Nazi regime.

This was a brilliant concept and helped me greatly understand resistance to Scientific change.

Essential to understanding how we come to know what we think we know about science.

The Title was misleading. I was looking for an analysis of the Ancient Hebrew Genesis. It went into the "Pass It On" Box.

Ludwik Fleck is an unjustly neglected author and scientist whose seminal work in the 1930s was hugely influential on Thomas Kuhn. As well as emphasizing the social nature of scientific thought through an exploration of the development of scientific thinking about syphilis, Fleck introduces the idea of thought collectives as a "special carrier" of scientific thought. Those who are familiar with the concepts of communities of practice and other social learning theories will benefit from a careful read of Fleck's work, the dynamics of thought collectives, and how some thought collectives differ from scientific thought collectives. His thoughts on how thought collectives affect the growth and development of novel ideas is particularly relevant in light of the current interest in intellectual property.