Who Lost Russia?: From the Collapse of the USSR to Putin's War on Ukraine

This book is a compelling and easy to read background of events leading up to the crisis in Ukraine. It also helps that it is roughly chronological and does not jump around too much.The epilogue is also interesting, as are the more contemporary interviews with some controversial Russians.On p342 the author concludes: If anyone is responsible for losing Russia, then it is Putin.But given all the excellent work the author has done up until this point, it seems like a rather lazy conclusion that simply follows the MSM demonization of Putin as the new 'Hitler' and makes him personally responsible for everything, letting everyone else off the hook.How convenient - as the SNL church lady would say.Or as Sonny Corleone might have said: You’re taking this very personal.Obviously Putin has a starring role in this disaster movie but there were a lot of other supporting actors, as Conradi makes clear in the 363 pages leading up to his conclusion. And it's not clear that Russians themselves consider themselves to be 'lost' like the children in Peter Pan.They certainly were in the 1990s but now is a different question.In terms of Ukraine in early 2024, it seems very unlikely that anyone will want to fight a second Crimean war to get the Crimea back. Although we could do with a Florence Nightingale to bring some 'fresh air' into the situation.The divided Ukraine solution, as mentioned by Conradi in his epilogue, seems worth considering if anyone cares about peace rather than 'pulverizing Russia' that some have called for in the western press.That solution means a neutral western Ukraine backed by security guarantees from both sides and a UN monitored referendum in the east to either stick with Ukraine or secede formally to Russia. As Conradi suggests, (p337) if western Ukraine rejects corruption and becomes a beacon of democracy then it's only a matter of time before the east will want to rejoin its western neighbour a la reunification of Germany.But all of this could just be wishful thinking.Why no NATO for Ukraine? Because it becomes 'airstrip two' - to use an Orwellian term - which would not bode well for the people of Ukraine come the next conflict. And I am writing this from 'airstrip one' (i.e. the UK).Of course Ukraine has every right to join NATO - it just has to accept the consequences of doing so when it sits right next to a powerful neighbour. A bit like Mexico would have to do if there was a coup and the new government decided to request the protection of China.But 'compromise/appeasement' solutions like this seem far off in yet another highly polarized situation where neither side wants to back down and needs to win at all costs. Meanwhile, lots of 'Europeans' die.

I enjoyed the book and thought it a very good overview of the period and personalities. Being of an age to remember all the events pretty clearly, there were few surprises and I was once at a function where Mr Gorbachev was the guest speaker and at another where delegates from the Kazakhstan government were seeking to establish trade and culture links. I have always felt that Mr Gorbachev was too often faced with situations that overwhelmed his sensibilities so was damned anyway - he was not a ruthless man. Too often, the West exploited this and - if I remember rightly, President Clinton admitted that there was a gentleman's agreement not to take the Baltic States into NATO but it was ok when it happened because nothing had been in writing. I think Yeltsin gets off too lightly. A drunk and very corrupt, he trashed the economy and utterly demoralised the military - I have on occasion met Russian officers and know how proud and patriotic they are. I can't remember Russia having oligarchs before Yeltsin. Honestly, I really don't think Americans even begin to understand or relate to Russians - they have a hard time with West Europeans - and we shouldn't be surprised therefore that we are now back to a situation where relations are less than warm. Having said this, I don't really agree with Mr Conradi's conclusion on the last page which is that.......... That would spoil it so you must read the book!

Who lost Russia? A very good question which reflects the book’s emphasis on Russian foreign policy, not surprising as the author is the Sunday Times foreign editor and was their correspondent in Russia in the 1990s. Having lived there myself for a time I always find myself woefully unprepared when asked what IS actually happening in Russia and why – and this book was the perfect solution for me. It’s a fascinating insight, written in a captivating journalistic style so an easy as well as an informative read. I liked the fact that it’s so well balanced (no Russia bashing here) and is critical of the West’s underestimation of Russia and Putin.It covers the last 25 years of Russia’s history following the collapse of the Soviet Union, when the West thought that the country was going to be welcomed back into the democratic fold and watched with growing concern as instead it eased back into a communist style autocracy.The book also explains Putin’s huge popularity in Russia – they are a proud people who want a leader who is respected on the world stage. I enjoyed the author’s interviews with key figures on both ‘sides’ and the little anecdotes, including the time Clinton discovered Yeltsin wandering rather drunkenly outside the White House in his underpants in search of a pizza!Highly recommended. I thoroughly enjoyed it and am now a star turn at dinner parties.

For an up to date well written account of the period leading up to the current challenges posed by Putin's illegal invasion of Ukraine, this is essential reading.

We chose Conradi's Who Lost Russia for our history and politics book club with the aim of understanding more about Russia's politics post Cold War.The book was clearly written and broken down into three sections, largely split into chronological chapters, that were easy to follow.The first third of the book took a balanced view from U.S and Russian perspectives, whereas arguably the second and third sections swayed more towards a pro-western approach.The book brings the reader right up to the 2016 election of Trump so is an extremely interesting read in the context of the first meeting between Putin and Trump at the 2017 G20 Summit last week.Would highly recommend.

Quality product that never lets you down for the price.

Who Lost Russia: From the Collapse of the USSR to Putin's War on Ukraine is a must read for anyone interested in the current events in Ukraine. Even though the book was published in 2017, it provides the context for the war and gives the history necessary to know about modern-day Russia's paranoia. The author was an 8-year foreign correspondent in Russia for the London Times (and is now in charge of foreign news at the Times). His insights are important to know and the book is easy to read, even though if contains Russian names, most of which end in -vich, -vych, -sky, -ski, -chenko, etc. To sound out names, start with the last syllable. This book is a must read.

Must read to understand the equation betqeen ukrain and russia

This is a good summary of the history of US-Russian relations over the last few decades, and a good reminder of how we ended up where we are today--the euphoria and hope of the early nineties was gradually replaced by disappointment, then by grudging recognition that the US and Russia had different geopolitical goals and ideas about how to attain them, and now by a surly hostility.This book does a good job of walking readers through that history--from the breakup of the eastern block and the Soviet Union itself, to Kosovo, to the fateful expansion of NATO, Georgia, the color revolutions, the Arab Spring, Euromaidan, etc... While I can't say that there were any particular insights in this history--really nothing more than I've picked up from an avid reading of the international press over the years--it was handy to have the history summarized in one well-written volume, as this author has done. For those of you who have not followed US-Russia relations over the years but would like to get up to speed, this will be a very helpful volume. The author also does a fine job of briefly dismissing some of the conspiracy theories relating to some of these events.Most of the sources for this work seem to be from various news articles, memoirs, and similar secondary sources, albeit well-chosen and relevant secondary sources...while the author conducted some interviews for the book, I can't say that they add much to the narrative. In particular, his few interviews in Moscow (arranged by a colleague) seemed to have been tacked on at the end because he didn't know where else to put them. While the author was a journalist in Moscow, he left long ago (1995!) and he seems rather out of touch with what is going on there now.As to the titular question--"Who lost Russia?"--I don't want to reveal the author's conclusion, but in my view the question cannot really be answered--no one "lost Russia," because unfortunately it was almost inevitable that a genuine and lasting American-Russian partnership would not emerge after the cold war--even if long-term national interests seem to align nicely, short term national interests and mentality are too different for a real partnership to endure.

The book appears to be an evenhanded review of Russia since the Soviet Union breakup. The internal situation probably could not have been altered much by outside influence. Russia has a history of authoritarian and strongman rule along with corruption. The citizenry does not appear to expect much more than to have a relatively decent living standard. Yeltsin has frequently been portrayed as a drunkard and a buffoon. He was a heavy drinker but he was also a cagey politician and knew that the right mix of democracy and strong leadership was difficult to attain. Foreign policy is a different matter. The US was too quick to boast about winning the cold war and being the only superpower. The west was also too quick to let down its guard and perceive Russia to be of little consequence (with 1000s of nukes this was a ridiculous notion). Quick expansion of NATO was alarming to Russia. While NATO inclusion of former satellites might have been grudgingly acceptable, inclusion of former Soviet republics like Ukraine was not. Ukraine had been part of the Russian empire for centuries and was only given "independence" as a ploy by Khrushchev to get more friendly votes in the UN. Ukraine is historically divided with the south and east ethnically linked to Russia and the western part more antagonistic. This resulted in significant Nazi collaboration during WW2. The policy of various US administrations toward Russia has been a combination of naiveté and stupidity. Putin, while amassing personal wealth from corruption, is no doubt a Russian patriot and pursues policies to increase Russian stature and influence in world affairs. He will support regimes that advance those aims. Syria is not a particularly savory client but having a warm weather naval base is highly advantageous. He also is unwilling to give up power because it will put him at risk. Yeltsin ceded power to Putin with the understanding that Yeltsin would be given blanket immunity from prosecution. As Putin ages he will also look for a friendly successor. The US can probably work with Putin and Russia in areas of mutual interest but Russia will always be a competitor on the world stage.

Are you worried about Russia interfering in our elections? Read this book and "discover" what USA has been doing in Eastern Europe and USSR/SU since 1917. We have not been shy in attempting to influence elections ourselves.Excellent book hugely relevant today. Great writing takes us through the most recent policies of Clinton, Bush and Obama.