The Origins of the First World War

A concise yet in-depth examination of why Europe went to war in August 1914. The authors cleverly tell the tale as a series of "concentric circles" of the war's approach: the July Crisis diplomacy, the military and naval factors, the influence of the domestic politics of the various countries involved, how the economic conditions of Europe contributed (or didn't) to the breakout of war, the effect of imperial rivalries and finally, the "mood" and cultural assumptions of the peoples and leaders of Europe in that era. The result is a book that seems to examine all the important factors without drifting into either a narrative of diplomatic minutiae or an over-dependance on balance sheet charts to attempt to chart the course of the origins of the war. The writing is crisp and to-the-point throughout, and one comes away with a much firmer understanding of the underlying factors, as well as the mechanics of the breakout itself. Highly recommended.

It’s good

Great book a must read!

Great addition to any first WW collection. The thematic chapters are odd at first, but facilitate the reading in the long term.

the authors make a very profound review of all the political ,economic and social facts active in Europe in 1914 ,But the very disappointing fact is that in the final chapter under the pompous name of Conclusion they conclude nothing at all!!.

The books analyses the origins from different angles like the general mood of the population, economical considerations of the various Great Powers, the alliance system and more. It is fairly balanced in my opinion with the expected good will for the British side and an only moderate bashing of the Germans. One thing he really obsesses on though is the German Emperor and at times he even gets it really wrong. So he writes: The Kaiser, with characteristic tactlessness had thanked Emperor Franz Joseph to his "brillianten Sekundantendienst" which is translated as "brilliant services as a second". The German word Sekundantendienst is far more specific than the English word second which can have various meanings. While the authors judgement of tactlessness only makes sense if he understood the word second as subordinate or inferior in position, rank, or importance this is not what Sekundantendienst means. The meaning implied here is that of a second in a duel who was a trusted person of the principal (or person dueling) who would negotiate the duel on their behalf. So, rather than putting him down as inferior, the German Kaiser was pointing out that the only man that could be trusted during that conference (duel) was the Emperor Franz Joseph. So how that can be considered tactless I simply don't understand. Nonetheless, a book worth reading.

The Origins of the First World War by James Joll was a concise but informative study of the major causes of the catastrophe that engulfed Europe and much of the world from 1914-1918. Joll began the book with a summary of the July Crisis of 1914 which was the proverbial straw that broke the camel's back. The rest of the chapters examined the major problems in Europe that made war inevitable. This review will examine each chapter and its importance in making World War I inevitable. There were two major alliance systems in Europe in 1914: the Triple Alliance of Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy and the Triple Entente which consisted of France, Great Britain, and Russia. The lesser powers in Europe sided with one alliance or another, and their loyalties changed when it suited them. Joll explained how those alliances were formed. It was surprising how weak they were, as Austria-Hungary was frequently at odds with both Germany and especially with Italy. Great Britain also had problems with both France and Russia in the colonial sphere. If it was not for these alliances, then the July Crisis would have either never resulted in a war or the war would have remained localized in the Balkan Penninsula. I found the next chapter on armaments and strategy to be especially useful. While many nations were spending vast amounts of money preparing for war and conscripting their young men, other states such as Austria-Hungary were spending a relatively low percentage of their Gross Domestic Product (GDP) on defense. I was surprised that France was investing far more of its resources preparing for the next war than Germany (the French had a three year conscription program). There were several aspects of strategy that I found especially interesting. General Conrad von Hotzendorf of Austria-Hungary desperately wanted a war as soon as possible to unite the multi-ethnic nation and prevent Serbia from being able to incite the Slavic population. It was also interesting that both Austria-Hungary and Russia were both expanding into the Balkans, making a collision course inevitable. Finally, Germany and Austria-Hungary wanted a war in 1914 because Russia was in the midst of a vast building program (with French money) and they would be virtually unstoppable if the war was delayed until 1916 or 1917. The chapter on domestic politics demonstrated that many of these nations viewed the war that arose from the July Crisis as a potential diversion from problems at home. The situation in Austria-Hungary has already been mentioned. The Russians believed that they could not back down from the conflict because they had failed to support the Slavic peoples in the Balkans twice before in 1878 and 1911; they would lose virtually all credibility if they backed down a third time in 1914. The Russians also hoped that a victorious war would enable them to achieve their dream of capturing Constantinople. According to Joll, the issue of Irish home rule was tearing the British apart, and they looked forward to a distraction on the Continent. While France still coveted the lost provinces of Alsace-Lorraine, they did not expect to liberate them anytime soon. Joll believed that the French would have preferred to delay the war until her Russian ally had completed her militarization program. Imperial rivalries proved to be a minor cause of the war. The author wrote about both the Fashoda conflict and the Moroccan crises in detail. These crises proved how weak the two alliance systems were, as England and France nearly went to war over the former and Italy failed to support Germany in the latter. Nonetheless, nobody was willing to go to war over colonies in Africa, Asia, and the Pacific. The most important consequence of imperialism to the outbreak of World War I was that Russia was forced to turn west to the Balkans as an avenue for expansion after they were defeated by Japan in 1904-1905. Joll's overall opinion of the mood of the Europeans towards war was ambiguous. While there were some ultra-nationalist groups in all countries, they were balanced out by Socialists who opposed war. The Socialists hoped that a general strike might prevent Europe from mobilizing for war in the summer of 1914. According to Joll, there were some strikes (especially in France), but this movement was essentially killed when a French nationalist assassinated Jean Jaures ended any possibility that the Socialists could prevent the war; in reality, nationalism proved more powerful that Socialism in 1914. I was impressed by The Origins of the First World War. This book was clear and concise. It analyzed the major issues in enough detail to give the reader a clear idea as to why war was declared. Not only did one learn about the July Crisis that officially began the war but also the underlying causes that led to this crisis.

I am in the midst of a splurge of books on the origins of the First World War. I am now the owner of more than ten volumes on the subject, It is such a vital topic, that we need to understand how and why the War came about, if for no other reason than to prevent it happening again. This book is a compendious, thoughtful (it does not make assumptions when they do not know the reasons but still considers all the factors) and thoroughly considered and reasoned text which considers the two vital questions, what happened and why. The more one reads, the easier it has become to appreciate the failures, the defective personalities of the leading protagonists and the lack of democratic accountability in the leading states. Those defective characters, be it the Kaiser, the Tsar, Bethmann Hollweg, the Hapsburg Emperor and his advisers, and the senor German authorities, never asked themselves the simple question as to whether they might be wrong about about their intended consequences and whether there was an alternative answer or solution or whether the end result might turn out in a different way. The consequential waste in blood, treasure and freedom for the ordinary citizens was similarly fruitless!

This is a fantastic book! You really get to understand the origins of the war, for example the Balkan wars, archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination, Austro-Hungary's ultimatum to Serbia, who mobilised first, and the international alliances that destabilised the "balance of power" in Europe. There's so much more to this brilliant book. You won't regret purchasing it.

The book expertly explains the many complex strands that led to the War.I have read several account of the War, but this one struck me as being exceptionally balanced and expertly researched.I am frankly in awe of James Joll's breadth of knowledge, his research skills and his ability to convey complex issues to the layman.If you are seeking great insights into the causes of the War then this is the book for you.

5 stars