Digital Apollo: Human and Machine in Spaceflight (Mit Press)

You might think a book entitled "Digital Apollo" would be about the development, programming and operation of the digital computers in the Apollo Command (CM) and Lunar (LM) Modules. You would be partially right. About half of Dr. David Mindell's superb volume covers those subjects, very readably and in great detail. But the book's scope is far broader than that. It is really nothing less than a comprehensive examination of the relationships between humans and machines from the earliest days of aviation, through the X-15, Mercury, Gemini, Apollo and Space Shuttle eras, and into the future of spaceflight.It's a fascinating story that has not, to my knowledge, previously been told in any depth. The evolution of the Apollo computer hardware and software occurred in parallel with the evolution of the attitudes of steely eyed NASA astronauts, who fought hard to avoid relinquishing any control to machines. All the early astronauts were test pilots--their hard-won experiences with primitive vacuum-tube systems in aircraft had convinced them that "electronics always fail." Thus they opposed NASA's decision, mandated by the complexity of lunar missions, to depend largely on new-fangled transistorized digital computers to help them fly the Apollo spacecraft. At one time, in those days before "fly-by-wire" control systems, some Apollo astronauts wanted actual cables connecting a conventional aircraft-type stick with the CM's attitude control rocket motors. That didn't happen. They feared that computer failures would jeopardize their missions and perhaps cost them their lives. That also didn't happen. To find out what DID happen, there's no better source than "Digital Apollo."Dr. Mindell says his book "...tells the story of the relationship between human and machine in the Apollo project and how that relationship shaped the experience and the technology of flying to the moon. It is a story of human pilots, of automated systems, and of the two working together to achieve the ultimate in flight. It is also a story of public imagery, professional identities and social relationships among engineers, pilots, flight controllers and many others, each with their own visions of spaceflight." That's a good summary, but I'd like to add to it. First, words like "social relationships" and "working together" and "visions" should not deter technophiles from reading "Digital Apollo." Those subjects are all in there, but much of the book is at the down-and-dirty technical level of bits and bytes and magnetic core memories and DSKYs and other esoterica. Dr. Mindell superbly integrates the human and computer stories in a way that almost anyone should find interesting. Second, "Digital Apollo" is one of the best-written spaceflight books I've read in years. Its tone is brisk and conversational, but the information it contains is deep, broad and very well-explained. You don't have to be a space cadet to enjoy it. It is also exceptionally accurate. I came across only a few minor errors in the parts of the story that I know, such as calling a metal alloy used in the X-15 "Iconel-X" rather than "Inconel-X" (the alloy and the name came from the International Nickel Company, hence "Inco")."Digital Apollo" fills a niche in the history of technology and spaceflight in a most outstanding way. It reminds me a little of Tracy Kidder's " The Soul of A New Machine ," and that is high praise indeed. Even if you think you know Apollo, you should read it. You're sure to learn a lot, and be entertained in the process. I recommend it most highly.

In "Digital Apollo" David Mindell has created a thoughtful and readable account of the design of the Apollo Guidance Computer (AGC), the software that allowed it to succeed, the history of its use, and the bigger picture issues of human factors and automation interface issues in complex systems in general. While I differ with him on some of his perspectives (I am a pilot, and tend to side with the "man in the loop" opinions held by the astronauts, most eloquently voiced by Neil Armstrong and Dave Scott), I found the entire book engrossing and his approach to complex human factors, ergonomic, and automation issues to be extraordinarily useful, especially to professionals in the field.The book traces the history of the AGC, discusses its growth and capabilities, and its real world use. I was especially pleased with chapters nine and ten which dealt in detail with each of the six landings, differences between the landings, and differing attitudes held by the various astronauts about the computer and its functionality. I was pleased with the detailed coverage that Apollo 12 got, and the explanations of the increasing complexity of the "J missions" which took heavier LMs into much more difficult terrain much more steeply. Mindell gives the best explanation I have yet read (p. 205) of the use of the Landing Point Designator (LPD), and computer incorporation of landing radar returns and resulting Delta H data into final altitude solutions for the crew. As an aside, don't stop reading until the very end: the very last page (p. 361) contans an excellent explanation of the extremely well rendered cover illustration depicting the view from Armstrong's window at about 520 feet above the lurain.The book is, like any endeavor of this scope, not perfect, with an occasional error or typo: most seem to be due to spell check artifacts not recognizing unusual word use. (The most obvious example is the discussion of the Apollo 1201 and 1202 program alarms on p. 222 which he refers to as "executive overload" instead of "executive overflow" alarms, even though he subsequently used the word overflow correctly in reference to these same events. Amusingly enough, the quote about the alarms from Norman Mailer doesn't really make sense if you read the word as "overload.") This is, of course, nitpicking, and I absolutely don't intend to take away from a brilliant career accomplishment.The ideal reader for this book will care passionately about manned space flight, and will find Apollo especially worthy of in-depth study. The book does not require any previous knowledge of spaceflight, human factors, computer interface issues, or aviation, but will be slower going for someone with no background in those areas (though still worthwhile). It is not a technical book in the sense that only engineers, programmers, astronauts, or pilots can glean useful information from it, but it does touch on a variety of complex subjects. Fortunately Mindell is more than up to the task and makes learning about this fascinating subject highly rewarding. I recommend this book very highly.

When NASA set out to recruit astronauts for the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programmes they limited their selection to test pilots (mainly military), with the consequence that astronauts were pilots who wanted to "fly" their spacecraft. However piloting in space is governed by Newtonian mechanics rather than aerodynamics, and humans simply don't have the ability to navigate a spacecraft in deep space without considerable assistance from auto-pilots, radars, gyroscopes, accelerometers ... and, inevitably, computers to tie all this information together.This book considers the technical development of the digital computer used in the Apollo Guidance and Navigation Computer, how the astronauts responded and adapted to this new method of flying, and how they in turn influenced the development of the computer and navigation system to suit their needs. So, unusually, the book covers both the development of the technology and the psychology of the human response to this.The author traces the development of automated guidance systems in a logical progression from the early ballistic missiles, through the early experimental supersonic flights (X15 etc) to the NASA spacecraft of the 1960s. There is a wealth of detail about how MIT (who got the Apollo guidance contract without any competition, which raised a few hackles) developed the guidance computer from scratch. This in itself is fascinating, for example the "programs" were wound into "ropes" of magnetic cores by ladies with knitting needles! Apollo was also the first example of "fly by wire": the astronauts had hand controllers for the attitude thrusters, but their input had to be modified by the computer so that they got the response they expected.In parallel with this the author describes the inevitable tensions between the "stick and rudder" test pilots who wanted to fly the craft, and the automated guidance gurus who saw the astronauts as superfluous to piloting in space. It is here that I feel the book falls down a little since the author is clearly biased in favour of the computer and against the human pilot when it comes to space-flight. His approach, especially in the early chapters, is almost patronising in this respect and nearly caused me to give up on the book in irritation. However I am glad that I persevered because the later chapters are both more interesting and also give a more balanced account of how both men and machines adapted and learned to work with each other.To give an example the astronauts insisted upon having an "8 ball" artificial horizon built into both command and lunar modules to give them a sense of their current orientation. This added weight and complexity, and was considered unnecessary by some, so there was a tussle between management and astronauts leading to its repeated insertion and deletion from the spacecraft. The astronauts won, and it is just as well that they did because a novel use of the "8 ball" was required to orient Apollo 13 during its manually controlled burn on the way back to the earth.Another example is the final landing on the moon: the lunar model had the ability to land itself, but *every* lunar module commander took over manual control for the last few hundred feet - this was true piloting, and entirely justified in the case of Apollo 11 which would otherwise have landed in a field of boulders. However every simulation in which the astronauts tried to "fly" the lunar module by hand all the way from lunar orbit to surface resulted in a crash - both sides of the argument had to recognise their limitations.In reality it took both men and machines working together to perform a manned moon landing, neither could have done it reliably on their own, and had the author accepted that and written the book in a more objective and unbiased fashion I would have rated it 5 stars.

Bought this book to learn about the Apollo missions computer to try and understand how it all works. This book is nothing to do with the Apollo digital computer. All a bit misleading. If you want to know how man and computer work in fight the this might be for you. But if you are interested in the Apollo space missions then I don’t think this is the book. I also found it to be very boring I’ve basically can’t finish the book not 100% sure why it was even written

I am very interested in the history of the apollo missions and the computer systems that enabled them to land on the moon. This book is in two halfs, the first is more focused on the astronauts and the pre apollo planes and training. The second half focuses on the computing and technology usef.

Working in IT, and having always had an interest in the Apollo missions, i found this book fascinating. A great history of technology advances made for Apollo, and also a detailed minute by minute record of the first landing.

Today we take human-machine interaction for granted, but obviously in the beginning, somebody had to come up with a paradigm for it all. This book provides intriguing insights on the "pilot vs. passenger" space flight debate and makes for fascinating reading, both for space buffs and for vintage computer enthusiasts.